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Love ye therefore the stranger

DEUTERONOMY 10:19
We are coimnanded to honor and fear our parents. We are commanded to obey the prophets. A man may honor and fear and
obey without loving. But in the case of strangers we are commanded to love them with the whole force of our heart's affection.

MAIMONIDES
INTRODUCTION

Peoples, races and groups have been in movement as far back
as history records; they have drifted from place to place as a result
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of armed conflict, conquests, famines, the opening of new territory
and the changing of economic and climatic conditions.1 Whereas
the migratory behavior of early peoples may be characterized as
"nations, races and clans in motion,"2 recent immigration to the
United States has increasingly become identified with individuals
and families propelled to our melting pot as a result of adverse
economic currents in their homelands. The immigrant could be
loosely defined as the "economic refugee." 3 His incentive in migrating to the United States is to pursue the great American dream
of success and self-betterment through diligence and perseverence.
He wishes to extricate himself from desperate and hopeless poverty
in a cultural and economic context which affords no opportunity
for advancement. He wishes to embark upon a new life in America,
the land of opportunity.
Our economy has traditionally served as a giant magnet drawing
the less fortunate from all over the world. The incentive to come
is great. Expense, temporary personal hardship or even peril are
no deterrent. Once the alien makes the determination that he
must come to the United States, desire turns to compulsion, and
if he cannot immigrate lawfully pursuant to the restrictive and
complex provisions of the amended Immigration and Nationality
Act, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) he explores other possibilities of migration.4 He may attempt to enter the United States surreptitiously across the Mexican or Canadian border; he may seek
a tourist visa or temporary work visa misrepresenting his intention
1. For analysis of contemporary migration movements of peoples as a
result of civil turmoil, war, pestilence and oppression, see Fragomen, The
Refugee: A Problem of Definition, 3 CASE W. RES. J. INTP'L L. 45 (1970).
2. 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA AmERICANA 713-15 (Americana Corp. Chicago, Ill.
1957).
3. For discussion of the concept of the new migrant as an "economic
refugee," see A. FRAGOMVEN, THE ILLEGAL ALEN: CRnVNAL OR EcoNoNuc
REFUGEE (Monogram, Center for Migration Studies 1973).
4. The Immigration & Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et
seq. (1970) permits immigration to the United States of persons who have
close family relations (United States citizen or permanent resident alien)
and job skills in short supply. In 1965, the traditional system of "sponsorship" by an interested party in the United States was abolished. Act of
Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 1, 79 Stat. 911, amending 8 U.S.C. § 1151

(1964).

For a general flavor of the complexity of the law, see I, H & I C. GOR(rev. ed. 1975).

DON & H. ROSENFELD, IM1IGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE

to be a bona fide visitor; in conjunction with his tourist visa application, he may present false evidence of financial support, false
evidence of employment or false letters of invitation from nonexistent relatives; he may "purchase" a fake passport bearing a
counterfeit visa; he may come as a crewman aboard a ship and,
when granted shore leave, never return to the vessel.5
Essentially, new migrants fall into two categories, persons who
immigrate lawfully as permanent resident aliens and persons who
are in the United States without proper documentation. In the latter category are (a) persons who enter the United States lawfully
as visitors, temporary workers, students, or in other valid nonimmigrant categories, and subsequently violate the conditions of their
admission by accepting unauthorized employment, or remaining in
the country beyond the period of time authorized by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, (hereinafter referred to as the Service), (b) persons who enter the United States by avoiding or evading the normal inspectional process at a designated point of entry,
and (c) persons who gain entrance through the use of fraudulent
documents. These persons are termed "illegal aliens", "illegal migrants", or more properly, "aliens without proper documentation."
Approximately 450,000 aliens lawfully immigrate to the United
States each year.1 There are no precise statistics available as to
the number of aliens without proper documentation who enter the
country each year. However, the Service located approximately
800,000 deportable aliens in the United States during fiscal year
1974.8

The Service estimates that at the present time there are approximately 12 million aliens without proper documentation. 9 Obviously, this creates a monumental law enforcement problem. Aliens
without proper documentation are literally everywhere. Not only
5. For detailed analysis of the current stimulus to migrate to the United
States and the myriad methods, both lawful and unlawful, for doing so,
see Hearings on Illegal Aliens, Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Nationality and InternationalLaw of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d,
93d &94th Congs. (1972-75).
6. "Illegal alien" is a particularly imprecise term since it connotes unlawful entry into the United States. Consequently, in the interest of clarity,
this term will be avoided. The concept of an "illegal migrant" is rooted
in the belief that in spite of an absence of proper immigration status, the
majority of the undocumented aliens are here to remain since the Immigration & Naturalization Service does not have the wherewithal to remove
them.
7. See 1967-74 INS ANN. REP.
8. 1974 INS AxN. REP.
9. U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, July 22, 1974, at 27.
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do they permeate the area near the Mexican border, but they are
located in metropolitan areas throughout the country. Since the
majority of these aliens are from countries where a language other
than English is the native tongue, and since many of them are foreign in appearance, for instance Latin-Americans who ethnically
have a mixture of native Indian lineage, Orientals, etc., there is a
great predilection on the part of the government to concentrate law
enforcement efforts on segments of the populace manifesting these
characteristics. Since United States citizens of such minority
groups are often down-trodden themselves, there is no hue and cry
concerning the government's questionable police tactics.
Thus, juxtaposed are the interest of the society as a whole to
stem the flow of aliens without proper documentation and the right
of all persons-the citizen, the permanent resident alien, and the
alien without proper documentation-to be free from abhorrent police practices characteristic of a totalitarian state. Striking the
proper balance is a delicate procedure. Individuals' rights must be
observed, but, at the same time, the enforcers of the law must not
be rendered impotent.
The presence of great numbers of aliens without proper documentation within the United States is a phenomenon of current vintage,
dating to the Act of October 3, 1965,10 which for the first time
imposed numerical limitations upon Western Hemisphere immigration. That Act restructured immigration to permit only persons
with close family relations and job skills in short supply to immigrate.'1 This was the logical consequence of a law adumbrated
by ever increasing severity and restrictiveness. 12 The evolution
has been dramatic. During the first one hundred years of America's history, the immigration policy was one of essentially unim10. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, 79 Stat. 911.
11. A numerical ceiling of 120,000 persons was placed upon the number
of immigrants per year from independent countries in the Western Hemisphere and a ceiling of 170,000 persons for natives of the Eastern Hemisphere. The old system of no numerical restriction for the Western
Hemisphere and per country limitations for the Eastern Hemisphere was
abolished.
12. Higham, American Immigration Policy in Historical Perspective, 21
LAw & CONTEIMVP. PROB. 213 (1956). See generally J. HIGHAM, STRANGERs
For a
IN THE LAND: PATTEws OF A MICAN NATnIsm 1860-1925 (1955).
recent survey with a restrictionist point of view, see M. BEuNET, AivErUCAN IMMGRATION PoLIcIEs (1963).

peded immigration. The gates were wide open and the borders
were left unguarded.' 3 It was not until August 3, 1882 that Congress enacted the first general law regulating immigration.' 4
13. Available for public distribution by the INS is the following leaflet:

INS,

DEVELOPMENT OF ILVMGRATION&

HISTORY

NATURALIZATION

(Prepared by L. Paul Winings, Form M-67 _).

LAWS AND SERVICE

14. This excluded paupers, criminals and other aliens deemed undesirable due to health conditions; furthermore, it formalized procedures for the

admission of immigrants and concurrently ushered in a head tax of fifty

cents. F. AuERBAcE, THE IMIiGRATION Am NATIONALiTY ACT 6 (Common
Council for American Unity, Inc., New York, N.Y. 1953). The same year
witnessed the enactment of the first Chinese exclusion law which, with numerous extensions in subsequent years, remained on the books until its ultimate repeal in December of 1943. In 1891, updated legislation provided
for the exclusion of additional categories of aliens on health grounds and
of persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; the solicitation
of labor was also forbidden.
Unlike the nature of this article (which articulates the nature and extent
of fourth amendment rights which attach to aliens by virtue of their presence within the United States' borders), legislation such as the 1891 law
aimed at excluding the alien before the nature of his rights derived by mere
presence could ever become a litigable question. The attitude that an alien
who seeks admission to this country may not do so under any claim of right
is one that, although never having been properly explained, is firmly entrenched in our Constitution.
This proposition has been affirmed and re-enforced by the decisions of
the Supreme Court. Exemplary is the case of United States ex rel. Knauff
v. Shaughnessy, where Justices Douglas and Clark did not participate with
Justices Black, Frankfurter and Jackson dissenting. In the view of the
Court, as expressed by Mr. Justice Minton,
...
an alien who seeks admission to this country may not do so
under any claim of right. Admission of aliens to the United States
is a privilege granted by the sovereign United States Government.
Such privilege is granted to an alien only upon such terms as the
United States shall prescribe....
The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The
right to do so stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the
nation.
In a case decided in 1952, Mr. Justice Douglas, in a dissenting opinion
in which Mr. Justice Black concurred, agreed that
[t]he power of Congress to exclude, admit, or deport aliens flows
from sovereignty itself and from the power to establish a uniform
Rule of Naturalization. U.S. Const., Article 1, Sec. 8, Clause 4. The
power of deportation is therefore an implied one. The right to life
and liberty is an express one. Why this implied power should be
given priority over the express guarantee of the Fifth Amendment,
has never been satisfactorily answered. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,
342 U.S. 580, 599 (1952).
What Douglas has said of the power to deport may also be said of the power
to admit or exclude aliens. But he has not said it, nor has any member
of the court so uttered. The constitutional law with respect to the power
to deport aliens is simply that it is plenary; this power is in no way restricted by the Bills of Rights, except for the right to procedural due process.
However, recently a district court judge has held that under certain circumstances, deportation may constitute a cruel and unusual punishment proscribed by the eighth amendment. For a treatment of these and other cases,
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Now, with waiting lists for qualified intending immigrants from

the Western Hemisphere running in excess of two years, with the
narrow definition of family ties necessary to establish eligibility to
apply for immigration, and with rigid interpretation by the Department of Labor as to job skills in short supply, coupled with the
see M. KoN ITz, Cnr. Ricirs IN ImWIGRATioN 3 (1953).

In 1897, Congress passed a bill which provided for a literacy test for immigrants. This was vetoed by President Cleveland and strikingly similar
proposals were subsequently rejected by Presidents Taft and Wilson. But
in 1917, a persistent Congress passed over President Wilson's veto, the Immigration Law of 1917, Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 which monitored immigration rather strictly and put new teeth into the government's
power to exclude and deport. Higham, American Immigration Policy in
Historical Perspective, 21 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 213, 228 (1956). It included the problematical literacy test for aliens over 16 years of age and
even more controversially instituted an Asiatic barred zone which in effect
denied entry as immigrants to most Asian peoples. The exclusion law of
1918 followed shortly. To the delight of the restrictionist school, it barred
from entrance a plethora of groups which advocated the overthrow of the
government, the primary organizations excluded being alien anarchist societies. Act of Oct. 16, 1918, ch. 186, 40 Stat. 1012. See also R. DEVINE, AmERIcAN InwIGRATioN POLICY (1957).
In 1921, the United States undertook its first radical change of course in
its immigration policy. Prior to that marking point, essentially any person
who was in good physical and mental health, not functionally illiterate, of
good and sufficient moral character (nonturpitudinous) and not racially ineligible for naturalization could enter the country legally. But during the
First World War, a reaction against immigration commenced and rapidly
mushroomed. This reaction led to widespread public interest which was
articulated in the form of a demand for restrictions.
The resultant fear, to some extent an unfounded paranoia, stemmed from
recurring beliefs that this country had been admitting immigrants more
rapidly than it could assimilate them and from the fear that following the
war the United States would be inundated with immigrants desirous of extricating themselves from the distresses of Europe. F. AUERBACH, TEE ImAvnGRATION & NATIONALTY ACT 7 (1955). Accordingly, in May of 1921, Congress enacted a provisional law restricting the absolute number of immigrants. Because this piece of legislation assigned each country, except those
in the Western Hemisphere, a definite quota, it was commonly known as
the Quota Act. Though intended as an emergency measure, the Quota Act
remained in force for about 3 years. Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat.
5. In 1924, the permanent Immigration Act of 1924 was passed. Act of
May 26, 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153. It went into effect July 1st, and, in
conjunction with the Act of February 5, 1917, regulated American immigration until the effective date of the new Immigration and Nationality Act
of December 24, 1952.
The Act of 1952, sometimes referred to as the McCarran-Walter Act after
its sponsors in the House and Senate, perpetuates the immigration policies
of the earlier statutes with some significant modifications. For a comprehensive analysis of the purposes behind the act, see Besterman, Commen-

growing economic disparity between the "have" and "have-not" nations, the number of aliens without proper documentation continues
to grow. 15
Although under the Act there are three federal agencies primarily responsible for the administration of the immigration laws,
it is the Service whose officers are "administrative policemen."
They are empowered to interrogate, search for and arrest aliens.
Within the Service itself, they constitute the level of command responsible for the first-line enforcement of the law.16
The specific delegations of enforcement power to Service officers
are very broad indeed, although it is now clear that such delegations are subject to the rigorous dictates of the fourth amendment
whenever exercised beyond the border." The road to judicial aptary on the Immigration & Nationality Act, printed as a preface to Title
8 U.S.C.A. (1970). See also F. AFERBACH, IMMIGRATiON LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES (2d ed. 1961).
15. For backlogs of visa availability, see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, VISA OFFICE

BuLL. (Aug. 1975). The only family relationship through which a citizen or permanent resident alien can bestow a benefit upon an alien are parent, child, son, daughter, brother and sister.
16. On June 10, 1933, the Bureaus of Immigration and Naturalization
were consolidated as the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Labor under a Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization. On May 20, 1940 the President submitted to Congress a reorganization
plan whereby the INS was transferred from the Department of Labor to
the Department of Justice. All of the Secretary of Labor's powers then
vested in the Attorney General. The other two prominent agencies are the
Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs of the Department of State and
the Department of Labor. F. AuMBACH, IMMIGRATiON LAWS OF
STATES 37-39 (2d ed. 1961).

THE

UNITED

17. Statutory powers given to Service officials as a means of enforcing
the immigration laws are found in the Immigration & Nationality Act §§
287(a) (1-4), 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (1970).
Section 287 (a) (1) gives power to INS officers to interrogate without a

warrant any alien or anyone believed to be an alien as to his or her right to
remain in the United States, subject to the superimposed test that the belief

as to alienage be based upon founded suspicion, which is the same test as
promulgated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Mere Mexican or Chinese
appearance alone does not constitute the requisite founded suspicion.

United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 95 S. Ct. 2574 (1975).
Section 287 (a) (2) gives these same officers power to arrest any alien who

is attempting to enter the country at the border in violation of the law.
The section also authorizes officers to arrest aliens within the United States
who they have reason to believe are present illegally and are likely to es-

cape before a warrant can be issued. These rules are subject, however, to
the mandate that the arrestee be promptly taken before a hearing officer
with proper authority to examine.
Section 287 (a) (3) provides that within a reasonable distance from any
external boundary of the United States (by regulation of the Attorney Gen-

eral this has been deemed to be 100 miles), INS officials are empowered to
board any vessel within U.S. territorial waters or any aircraft, conveyance
or vehicle for the purpose of searching for aliens (not contraband in the

[VOL. 13: 82, 1975]

Searching for Illegal Aliens
SANS DIEGO LAW REVIEW

proval of regular fourth amendment restrictions upon "alien
searches" has been a rugged one. Nevertheless, the standards now
definitively apply and the de-prostitution of the amendment seems
imminent in both the Mexican border regions and urban centers. 1 8
In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the Service's power
to interrogate, search for aliens without a warrant, and make arrests is in an extremely delicate balance with the rights of aliens
who as persons physically present within the confines of the United
States are entitled to fourth amendment protection.19
The intent of this article is to outline the clearly emerging constitutional standards which the Supreme Court has said attach to
the broad powers granted to immigration officials. Historically,
there was never any constitutional logic supporting the position
that the fourth amendment's protections should not apply to immigration-related searches removed from the actual border. Recent
judicial decisions support this conclusion. 20
To be discussed in detail will be the evolution of the idea that
nonfrontier line searches and interrogations are subject to fourth
first instance).

While the statute makes no mention of a reasonableness

requirement as a precondition to commencing such a search, it is now the
law, set forth in the landmark Almeida-Sanchez v. United States decision,
that "probable cause" is required for these searches if removed from the
border or its functional equivalent. 413 U.S. 266 (1973). This section further provides that within 25 miles of an external boundary, INS officers
shall have access to private lands (but not dwellings) to patrol the border
to prevent entry of illegal aliens.
Section 287 (a) (4) grants power to make arrests for felonies committed
and cognizable under any law of the United States with respect to alien regulation, providing the arrested person is promptly charged by a proper official. In spite of the interwoven restrictions upon INS behavior, both
customs and immigration officials still have wide latitude and are virtually
unrestricted by the fourth amendment at the border or the functional
border.
See 8 C.F.R. §§ 287.1-.3 (1975) for a more detailed treatment of the above
provisions. Also, for a scholarly discussion of the minor limitations upon
intrusive body-cavity searches at the actual border see Note, Border

Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 YALE L.J. 1007 (1968).
18. Fragomen, Legislative and JudicialDevelopments-Judicial Decisions
of Interest, 24 INT'L MIGRATION REv. 459 (1975).
19. Id.

20. Such has been the position taken by the Service for quite some time.
It is based upon the belief that the United States' sovereign power to protect its borders extends virtually without limits to all areas reasonably said
to be border areas. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 324 U.S. 580 (1952).

amendment restrictions. 21 In spite of even the recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court, it is still apparent that there are a
few loose ends in the totality of the decisions. Furthermore, it is
still common practice, particularly with urban immigration officers
and certain reviewing administrative judges, to be insensitive to the
decisions and dicta of the Court as they relate to "blanket" searches
and unfounded interrogations conducted by these officials. 22 Urban "alien search" techniques and procedures shall be examined.
The discussion and analysis will indicate that a large proportion
of immigration operations are unconstitutional and, furthermore,
morally dangerous in that they institutionalize fear, suspicion and
contempt against a variety of ethnic and religious groups.
All Service enforcement systems will have to adjust their techniques to be as effective as possible within the dictates of the fourth
amendment. This can be done only by creative, dedicated and civicminded police work. The primary duty lies with the Attorney General and other administrators of the immigration laws who can take
it upon themselves to promulgate newer and more detailed search
and seizure procedures which focus upon following up responsible
leads, obtaining specific search warrants and fortifying actual border areas. With respect to these methods, there exists a greater
constitutional latitude to search.
In addition to traditional law enforcement procedures, the Service
supports the enactment of legislation to help control the influx of
aliens without proper documentation. 23 The necessity for legislation must be considered in a context of the efficacy of traditional
law enforcement mechanisms. Legislation aimed at an already nonfavored segment of the populace, which arguably would result in
additional minority group discrimination, should only be considered
21. See generally Note, Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77
YALE L.J. 1007 (1968).

22. As is oftentimes the case when the Supreme Court superimposes constraints upon law enforcement officials, there is a delay in having the new
limits take hold of prior enforcement techniques. For recent works on the
duty of law enforcement officials to promulgate their own newer rules
falling within the newly articulated constitutional limits and a discussion
of avoidance of an outdated "atomistic" approach, see Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Mmx. L. REv. 349 (1974) and
McGowan, Rule Making and the Police, 70 McH. L. REv. 659 (1972).
23. HR. 982, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), the so-called Rodino Bill has
been favorably reported by the House Judiciary Committee in the form of a
"clean bill," designated H.R. 8713. This bill would establish penalties to be
imposed upon employees who knowingly employ aliens who do not have
legal authority to engage in employment. For support of Service for this
proposal, see 1975 Hearings,supra note 5.
Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) has introduced a similar proposal
in the Senat% S. 3827.
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as a drastic measure. If the same result could be obtained through
enlightened enforcement within the dictates of the fourth amendment, this would be a preferable course of action.
THE EVOLUTION OF FoURTH AVEND1mENT RIGHTS OF ALIENS

In order to understand the current state of the law regarding
the applicability of fourth amendment protection of aliens, differentiation must be made between three types of searches. They are:
(a) searches conducted at the border or at a point which is the
functional equivalent of the border, (b) searches conducted in
proximity to the border but at a point removed from the border,
and (c) searches conducted in areas totally remote from the border,
such as urban areas. This division is inherent in section 287 of the
Act because this section speaks in terms of the power of an immigration officer to make a warrantless arrest of persons he has reasonable suspicion to believe are aliens. This section traditionally
has been used to justify urban area activities. Section 287 (a) (3)
grants immigration officers much broader power to conduct warrantless searches of vehicles and conveyances in proximity to the
border. This section historically has been utilized to support
searches in proximity to the border, although, as will be developed
later, the distinction is no longer as relevant. Finally, searches at
the border have never been predicated upon the authority contained
in section 287, but flow directly from the concept of sovereignty.

The fourth amendment provides
[t]he right of the people to be secure ... against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated and no [w]arrants shall
probable cause... particularly describing the place
issue but upon 24
to be searched.

Since the first border search statute was enacted in 1789,25 customs officials have been authorized to stop, search and examine any
vehicle, person or baggage arriving in the United States on the suspicion that merchandise subject to duty is being concealed or that
26
Customs
contraband is being brought into the United States.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
25. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43.
26. 19 U.S.C. §§ 482, 1582 (1970).

officials are also empowered to search any vehicle or vessel any27
where in the United States for contraband.
The constitutional validity of these provisions had never been
questioned. Regardless of their intrusiveness upon fourth amendment rights, all searches designated as border searches (customs
searches or searches for aliens) were automatically exempt from
28
the requirements of probable cause.
Customs searches without probable cause originally were conducted only at actual international borders. But in Carroll v.
United States,29 where the Supreme Court recognized that officials
must have probable cause to search those lawfully within the
country, such mandate (to conduct searches only upon probable
cause) immediately attached to customs officers who by that time
had begun to search within the country. The present standard
27. Id. § 1591(a). For a complete history of the development of
customs laws and border searches see, Note, In Search of the Border:
Searches Conducted by Federal Customs and Immigration Officers, 5 N.Y.U.
J. oF INT'L L. & POL. 93 (1972).
Also, for general histories of the border search concept see Note, The
Aftermath of Almeida-Sanchez v. United States: Automobile Searches for
Aliens Take on a New Look, 10 CAIFt. W.L. REv. 657 (1974); Comment, Border Searches-A Prostitutionof the Fourth Amendment, 10 ARIz. L. Rv.
457 (1968); Comment, The Reasonableness of Border Searches, 5 CALIF. W.L.
Rav. 355 (1968); 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 889. For the most scholarly treatment
see Note, Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 YALE L.J. 1007
(1968). In the words of the authors:

The border search exception to the Fourth Amendment should be

reexamined. Although border searches are differentiable as a class,
they are not internally homogeneous. The fact that an individual
has recently crossed a border does increase the probability that
illicit materials will be found, but at least where intrusive and extended border searches are concerned, the government should not
be exempt from normal requirements of probable cause (emphasis
added). Id. at 1018.
In spite of the above, the authors of this article admit that there is a
logical justification for permitting wide latitude to officials to search at the
borderline itself, and they admit that less than probable cause is permissible for nonintrusive and nonextended border searches. Searches conducted at the actual border are less reprehensible because an international
traveller is prepared to expect a search there (arguably he consents), and
since virtually all that cross the line are searched, such a traveller is part
of a neutral class of citizens and is therefore less humiliated when his privacy is infringed upon.
28. In dictum, the Supreme Court has discussed two rationales for the
constitutionality of the customs provisions. In Boyd v. United States, the
Court reasoned that border search statutes were historically valid because
they were authorized by the same Congress that proposed the fourth
amendment, and therefore, these searches were not regarded unreasonable.
116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886). In Carroll v. United States, the Court justified
the search on grounds of national self-protection. 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
29. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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definition for the authority of a federal customs officer to search
beyond the borderline proper is articulated in some circuits as a
"reasonable cause to suspect illegal goods," and in other circuits
as a "reasonable certainty that there are illegal goods located on
the person or in the place to be searched."80 While the permissible
distance from the border in which customs agents can search has
been extended in recent years, the fourth amendment standards
clearly remain. Whether they are in fact ignored or abused is difficult to ascertain.31
In 1875, federal immigration officers were first authorized to
search at the border for aliens seeking illegal entry into the United
States.3 2 It was not until 1946, however, that they were granted
power under section 287 (a) (3) of the Act to search vehicles within
a reasonable distance from any external boundary.3 3 The Attorney
General, acting on the authority given him by Congress, prescribed
"reasonable distance" to be within 100 air miles of the border.34
Under the statute, which conspicuously omitted constitutional
standards, immigration officers conducted searches without probable cause or suspicion by utilizing a variety of techniques such
as permanent checkpoints on heavily traveled roads, temporary
checkpoints for limited periods, and roving patrols in areas between
checkpoints. Supposedly these random spot checks were limited
to places in a vehicle where an alien may be hidden.3 5 Federal
circuit courts of appeal consistently upheld immigration searches
conducted away from the actual border. 36
30. United States v. Wel, 432 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,

401 U.S. 947 (1971); Valdez v. United States, 358 F.2d 721, 722 (5th Cir.

1966).

31. United States v. Caraway, 474 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1973). Herein, not
only were fourth amendment standards applied, but a concept of unreasonable elasticity to the border was rejected.
32. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477. In 1917, immigration
officers were authorized to board and search all conveyances entering the
United States. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 16, 39 Stat. 874, 886. This basic
authority is now incorporated in 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (a) (1970).
33. Immigration & Nationality Act § 287(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (13)
(1970).
34. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a) (2) (1975).
35. See Duprez v. United States, 435 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1970); Roa-Rodriguez v. United States, 410 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1969). But see United
States v. Miranda, 426 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1970).
36. United States v. Thompson, 475 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1973); Fumagalli
v. United States, 429 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1970).

Because immigration officers are also deputy customs officers,8 7
there was a properly perceived danger that they might abuse their
statutory authority to stop a vehicle without probable cause or suspicion. An immigration officer, if unlimited by the fourth amendment at the same time that customs officers were so limited, could
circumvent the suspicion standard required of a customs officer by
stopping a vehicle for an immigration search and while searching,
develop a reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that
contraband is hidden in the vehcile. He could then switch to his
customs officer's hat and make a thorough search of the vehicle.
Moreover, even without suspicion, the immigration officer could arrest a person for possession of contraband discovered in plain
38
view.
Despite criticism by commentators and dissenting judges, these
dual role searches were approved prior to recent Supreme Court
decisions. Even if there were no dual standard, the fact that immigration officials in border areas could whimsically annoy legal
travellers and harass naturalized foreign born citizens based upon
the mere appearance of foreign heritage was an insult to the integrity of American liberty. As a result of these searches, highway
travel in border areas became a burden; numerous aliens were
searched and evidence seized was frequently used to convict both
aliens and citizens alike.39
Unfortunately, the judicial development of theories with respect
to full-blown searches of vehicles undertaken by both immigration
and customs officials tended to minimize the importance of distance
from the actual external boundary line. This erosion of the original
concept continued until the term "border search" became judicial
shorthand for recognizing the power of federal officers to search
on almost whimsical suspicion, a far cry from the traditional "probable cause." Not until 1973, in the Supreme Court's landmark deci37. The legal basis of this authority is outlined in United States v.
Thompson, 475 F.2d 1359, 1362-63 (5th Cir. 1973).
38. Objects in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in that position are subject to seizure. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
39. Most illustrative of the concern evoked by the dual standard is a dissenting opinion by Judge Browning in United States v. Almeida-Sanchez,
which is now the law:
If a reason exists for distinguishing searches for aliens from
searches for merchandise, no one-including this court-has yet
suggested what it might be. Nothing in the words of the Constitution supports the distinction. And no one suggests that the public
interest in excluding inadmissible aliens is greater than that in excluding narcotics and other contraband. United States v. AlmeidaSanchez, 452 F.2d 459, 464 (9th Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion),
rev'd, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
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sion of United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 40 were standards established.
Searches conducted in the interior of the country were characterized by similarly unbridled discretion on the part of immigration
officers. Section 287 (a) (1) had authorized interrogation of persons
believed to be aliens. This was a sufficiently broad standard to
be regarded as carte blanche authority to question anyone who appeared or sounded "non-American." Moreover, the Service construed the concept of "interrogation" as not including the asking
of casual questions by plain-clothes investigators to elicit whether
the person spoke English. Not until 1971, with the decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, did
a judicially imposed standard curb this broad discretion. 41 Thus,
prior to several years ago, fourth amendment rights of aliens were
exceedingly constrained. Aliens could be interrogated or arrested
virtually anywhere, anytime.
Legislative and judicial permissiveness, resulting in minimal restraint upon immigration officers at the border, within border regions, and in the interior, began to create a variety of social problems. In addition to annoying unassuming travellers and legal
aliens by infringing upon their fourth amendment rights, the random stopping and questioning of persons at the border, near the
border, in metropolitan areas, and in public places created an attitude of suspicion and contempt against certain groups in our society. Average citizens began to see themselves as self-appointed
immigration officers. Without any founded suspicion, they began
to accuse their neighbors of illegal status, copying from the institutionalized techniques of the Service. There was something about
the unrestricted authority to search that de-Americanized the spirit
of America which was to accept and encourage the "tired and the
poor" of less fortunate nations. Perhaps many of these persons had
come to America to escape such police state tactics in their homelands.
THE BoRDER SEARCH
Almeida-Sanchez-Limiting the Border SearchArea
Section 287 (a) (3) of the Act empowers immigration officers to
40. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
41. Cheung Tin Wong v. INS, 468 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

search vehicles for aliens within close proximity to the border. As
previously mentioned, proximity to the border is defined by regulation as within 100 miles.
For the first time, in Almeida-Sanchez, the Supreme Court definitively limited the scope of the term "border search," and thereby
restricted the use of roving immigration patrols to search vehicles
for aliens, by holding that such warrantless searches were only permissible at border crossing points or the functional equivalent
thereof. 42 In that case, a Mexican citizen with a valid work permit was stopped by a roving immigration patrol in the early hours
of the morning on an isolated road twenty-five miles north of the
border.43 While searching the vehicle for aliens pursuant to
powers apparently granted under section 287 (a) (3), without a warrant or probable cause, the border patrol officers found marijuana
under the rear seat of the vehicle. Following a denial of his motion
to suppress the "tainted" evidence, defendant was convicted for possession of marijuana. 4 4 A divided Ninth Circuit later reaffirmed
the constitutionality of the statute and the constitutionality of the
search. A divided Supreme Court reversed, holding that the warrantless search, made without probable cause or consent, violated
the fourth amendment. 45 The effect of the decision was to apply
the strictures of the fourth amendment to a historically exempt
search situation. There never has existed, however, any historical
logic for excluding its applicability in the first instance. The
plurality opinion distinguished the case at bar from the line of automobile exceptions to "searches upon warrant" based upon the doctrine of Carroll v. United States.40 In that case the court held
42. 413 U.S. at 272-75.
43. Defendant was stopped on Highway 78 near the town of Glamis, California. Although the road did not run directly from the border, it was often
used by aliens who were illegally entering the United States. But, as on
most highways in this portion of the country, most travellers are "legal"
passers-by.
The officers had received an official bulletin informing them that aliens
sometimes had been found sitting behind the back seat rest with their legs
folded under a hollow back seat. Id. at 286 (dissenting opinion).
44. The majority held the search valid under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a), (c)
(1970) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a) (2) (1975); United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 452 F.2d 459, 460-61 (9th Cir. 1971).
45. 413 U.S. at 266. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court
in which Justices Douglas, Brennan, Marshall and Powell joined. Justice
Powell filed a concurring opinion. Justice White filed a vigorous dissenting
opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist joined.
46. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The Court approved the National Prohibition
Act's provision for warrantless searches of vehicles when there was "prob-
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that a stop and search of a mobile vehicle can be made without
a warrant. However, the Almeida-Sanchez facts did not fall under
that exception since as a condition to making warrantless automobile searches under Carroll, there must be probable cause in the
first instance. 47 The court also distinguished the facts in AlmeidaSanchez from the administrative search and inspection cases, particularly Camara v. Municipal Court,48 which permit a standard
of less than probable cause to implement the enforcement of health
and welfare regulations. To comply with the conditions of this sec-

ond exception, an area warrant4 9 or consent 5 ° is required; neither
of which was obtained here.

The entire Court directly recognized and restated the traditional
validity of a "true border" search which can still be conducted without either probable cause or a warrant. Such a search, however,
must take place at the frontier line or its functional equivalent.
Functional equivalency is determined by whether it is likely that
traffic which did not cross the border would arrive at that particular point.51 The search of Almeida-Sanchez's automobile occurred
able cause for believing" they contained illegal alcoholic beverages. Id. at
155-56.
47. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-52 (1970).
48. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
49. Camara v. Municipal Ct., id., and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541
(1967), are cases initially approving the use of area search warrants based
on less than traditional probable cause and introducing a balancing test to
determine whether an official intrusion of an individual's rights is reasonable.
50. The Court distinguished United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972)
and Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), which
involved gun control and liquor inspections. Individuals who enter into
those highly regulated businesses are aware of the use of inspections and
are deemed to have consented to them.
51. As examples of functional equivalents, the plurality cited (and this
is still the test) an established station near the border, a point marking
the confluence of two or more roads that extend from the border, or an airport receiving nonstop flights from Mexico. Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1971). This test makes it clear that any time
fixed or roving interrogations or searches are conducted at points removed
from the above functional borders, the fourth amendment applies in its
plenitude.
In Atmeida-Sanchez, the plurality stated that fixed checkpoints can be
considered the functional equivalents of the border only if they are at the
border, or very near to it, or if they are the first practical place where
searches can be made after crossing the border, due to inescapable conditions of the terrain. Distance on the road from the border was stressed

neither at the border nor at its functional equivalent. Thus, the
plurality disagreed with the lower court's holding that the search
was valid under section 287(a) (3) maintaining that the statute cannot authorize searches by roving immigration patrols not made at
the border or its functional equivalent, unless supported by probable cause or a warrant. The Carrolldistinction between warrantless searches at the border which are justified on the ground of
national self-protection and those occurring in the interior, which
require probable cause, was considered to be controlling. 2
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, recognized both the necessity of safeguarding a constitutionally protected right and "the
seriousness and legitimacy of the law enforcement problem with
respect to enforcing ... valid immigration and related laws." 8 He

alluded to an oft-applied balancing approach that would allow a
search to be based on an area warrant issued on less than traditional probable cause. 54 As will be analyzed later, such an approach would gravely undermine the constitutional strictness of the
plurality's decision. Under Justice Powell's approach, the border
patrol could obtain advance judicial approval of its decision to conduct roving or fixed searches on a particular road or road network
for a reasonable period of time. In Almeida-Sanchez, since the roving patrol did not have a search warrant of any kind, Justice Powell
concurred in finding the search unconstitutional.5 5
by the plurality. Apparently the dissent would hold that any fixed checkpoint away from the border, or any roving patrol for that matter, should
be considered the functional equivalent of the border. It would continue
to consider the term "border," as was traditionally done, to include all
checkpoints within the administratively-defined reasonable distance of 100
air miles. Id. at 288-89 (dissenting opinion).
52. It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent
were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding
liquor and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to
the inconvenience and indignity of such a search. Travellers may
be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self-protection reasonably requiring one entering the country
to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as
effects which may be lawfully brought m. But those lawfully
within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a
right to free passage without interruption or search unless there
is known to a competent official authorized to search, probable
cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or

illegal merchandise. Carroll v. United States, 132, 153-54 (1925).
53. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 275 (1973) (concurring opinion).
54. Using a Camarastyle approach, Justice Powell reasoned that an area
warrant is appropriate because of consistent judicial approval of these nonborder searches, absence of a reasonable alternative to solve this serious
problem, and the limited nature of the intrusion on those being searched.
Id. at 279. How a full-blown search of an automobile without prior notice
can be considered only a mild intrusion is difficult to comprehend.
55. The government's position in the case was that Camara, which re-
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The dissent contended that section 287 (a) (3) was validly applied
and that under the instant circumstances the stop complied with
the governing fourth amendment standard of "reasonableness." In
border regions with high concentrations of illegal aliens, the dissent
argued, all searches by Service officials are "reasonable." 56 Justice White noted that the Court has generally broadened the reasonableness standard when authorizing statutes have permitted
searches of the kind challenged herein, and that the instant statute
represents Congress' considered judgment, in accordance with its
duty to propose "constitutional" legislation, that proper enforcement of immigration laws in border areas requires random searches
of vehicles without a warrant or probable cause. 7 Since Congress
believed that the statute comported with the reasonableness standard, and since a number of courts of appeal traditionally have upheld these statutory searches in the immigration arena, the dissent
refused to invalidate the search.
In the aftermath of Atmeida-Sanchez, there was a great deal of
confusion in border areas and elsewhere as to what the Supreme
Court had mandated with respect to factual issues not directly before the Court. Apparently, even the dictum was not sufficient
to provide cohesive guidelines. In United States v. Byrd,58 a roving immigration patrol had stopped the defendant forty-five miles
north of the Mexican border shortly after midnight along a road
quires public health inspectors to obtain an area warrant after they are refused entry, should not apply because an immigration officer needs to
search a mobile vehicle instantly when he stops it. Id. at 269.
Although the Supreme Court has not directly placed the constitutional
imprimatur on the area-search warrant in the imigration context, it is possible that it will do so in the future. The dissenting Justices would approve
a search based on an area warrant. Id. at 288. If such were the rule, issuance of broad and indefinite area warrants would permit vehicles to once

again be stopped without probable cause or founded suspicion in border
areas, and the pre-Almeida standards would, in effect, be reinstated. Id.
at 287-89.
56. 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (dissenting opinion). Cf. Cady v. Dombrowski,

413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973) (governing standard under fourth amendment is
reasonableness).
57. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 291 (1973) (dissenting opinion). The dissent viewed the illegal alien problem as similar to
gun control, United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), and liquor,
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), and would
allow the same solution-a warrantless search without probable cause.
58. 483 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1973).

on which numerous previous violations had occurred. Without further suspicion, an officer inspected the rear seat for aliens, as per
traditional procedure, and detected the odor of marijuana which
later was found in the trunk. The district court had refused to
exclude the evidence because of a two-pronged analysis. First, the
court found that the stop was justified by section 1357(a) and its
accompanying regulations.5 9 Secondly, it found that in the course
of the valid vehicle search for aliens, the officers acquired probable
cause to belive customs laws were being violated which permitted
them to complete the search for contraband. The Fifth Circuit, in
a properly reasoned application of Almeida-Sanchez, concluded that
only "border" searches can be made without a warrant or probable
cause. Although the instant search was one conducted near the
border, the court found that it had not been made at the border
or its functional equivalent. Since the officers did not have probable cause to stop the vehicle and search in the first60 place, the court
reversed and held the search to be unconstitutional.
Applying the same rules, but with a slightly different result, the
1
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Bugarin-Casas"
addressed itself
to a factual situation in which a roving immigration patrol, while
passing through a high violation area, stopped the defendant after
dawn on an interstate highway within fifteen miles of the functional border. The arresting agents became suspicious because the
driver, apparently a Mexican, was alone and his station wagon was
riding low in the rear; their suspicion became greater since the
model being driven was one with an expansive compartment in
which hidden illegal aliens had previously been found. When an
agent looked through the rear window of the stopped vehicle, he
saw distinctively wrapped packages of marijuana in plain view
through a large crack in the floor board. Although the court affirmed the defendant's conviction for possession, it disregarded the
prosecution's theory, reliance upon section 287(a) (3). Instead, the
court substituted without hesitation a "founded suspicion" test
which is presently the law for immigration related stops for interrogation purposes, as propounded in the case of United States v. Brig62
noni-Ponce.

59. The accompanying regulations can be found in 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (9) (2)
(1975).
60. 483 F.2d at 1201. In reaching its holding, the court rejected the government's argument that the fact that the road on which this stop was made
ran directly from the border was a controlling distinction from AlmeidaSanchez under the facts of the instant case.
61. 484 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1973).
62. 95 S. Ct. 2574 (1975).
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Probably the best reasoned opinion interpreting Almeida-Sanchez
is the Second Circuit decision of United States v. Barbera.63 In
that case, the court found that where immigration officers had
boarded a bus in the vicinity of the border and had interrogated
the defendant, a passenger on the bus, for no ostensible reason,
the arrest was unlawful since it had not occurred at the border or
a functional equivalent thereof. The bus had originated within
the United States at a point several miles from the border. It had
traveled approximately 25 miles essentially parallel to the border
when the encounter with the immigration officers occurred. The
court found this not to be a functional equivalent of a border
point since the bus had not come directly across the border and
since the defendant could just as easily have been a United
States citizen who boarded the bus within the United States.
Soon after Almeida-Sanchez, two courts of appeal decided cases
in which the defendants relied upon Almeida-Sanchez. In both
cases, however, the alleged illegal searches had not been conducted
by "roving" immigration patrols. In United States v. Ragusa,64
the Ninth Circuit improperly interpreted Almeida-Sanchez when it
approved a search without a warrant and without probable cause.
In justifying its decision, the court stated that Almeida-Sanchez applies only to roving searches and implied that the instant search
was valid because the fixed checkpoint where the search was conducted, though distant from the borderline, was the functional
equivalent of the border.
63. United States v. Barbera, 514 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1975).

In Barbera,

Judge Oakes lucidly presents the sensitive issues in this delicate area of
the law:
What is at issue here is the balance to be struck between the Fourth
Amendment's protection from unreasonable searches and seizures
and the Government's conceded right to protect the integrity of its
borders. The problem of illegal immigration is one of national concern. The adverse economic impact caused by illegal aliens is substantial and well documented. But to respond to this problem by

watering down the probable cause requirements of the Fourth

Amendment is most surely to take the lowest constitutional road.
It would be dangerous precedent indeed for an economic problem,
regardless of its magnitude, to provide the basis for the erosion of
constitutional principles; much the more so when alternative solutions to the economic problem have been insufficiently explored by
other Branches of the Government. Id. at 301-02.

64. Criminal No. 73-1314 (9th Cir. July 11), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075
(1973).

A final case to be considered before the Brignoni-Ponce group
which seemed to be more deferential to the language of AlmeidaSanchez was United States v. King.65 In King, the defendant was
convicted of possession of marjuana after being stopped and
searched at a checkpoint ninety-eight air miles from the border. The
Tenth Circuit, while it should not have had any trouble in determining that the fixed checkpoint was not the functional equivalent
of the border, was unable to so decide. But despite its uncertainty,
the court did state that even at distant fixed checkpoints AlmeidaSanchez required probable cause or consent to conduct a warrantless search, unless a particular fixed checkpoint was the functional
equivalent of the border. While Almeida-Sanchez only decided the
necessary question relative to roving patrol searches, implicit within
the decision was an underlying philosophy which would extend the
same rationale to fixed checkpoints. Any doubt was resolved when
the Supreme Court recently ruled that Almeida-Sanchez does
extend to the fixed checkpoint search as well as the roving patrol. 60
Since the language of these decisions establishes the principle
that only searches at borderlines or their functional equivalents can
be conducted without full fourth amendment limitations upon police power, traditional probable cause standards now apply to all
immigration-related searches outside of this privileged zone. With
respect to the judicially created concept of the border's "functional
equivalent," determination of its parameters is not an overly onerous burden. The question merely requires a court to ascertain
whether a substantial percentage of persons who reach a certain
point would necessarily have crossed the border or have originated
in the United States.
In spite of the previously mentioned broad language of the majority decision, and in spite of the lower court cases dealing with
mere stops and interrogations, the Supreme Court has not addressed itself to the standards to be applied to Service officers'
powers to conduct interrogations anywhere in the continental
United States pursuant to section 287(a) (1). The Almeida-Sanchez
decision was restricted to an interpretation of section 287 (a) (3).
Moreover, the court did not take an absolute stand on the concept
of the area-warrant, which, if constitutional, would effectively ne65. 485 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1973).

The court directed the trial court to

reinstate the judgment and sentence only if it found the checkpoint to be
the functional equivalent of the border. Id. at 361.
66. The court held that fourth amendment rights are not mere second
class rights, but belong in a category of indispensable freedoms. 485 F.2d
353 (10th Cir. 1973).
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gate the decision. However, the fundamental principle has clearly
been established that the broad authority of section 287 (a) (3) can
only be interpreted consistently with the fourth amendment, if the
authority is deemed to extend to searches beyond the border or its
functional equivalent.
Brignoni-Ponce-Fourth Amemdment Limits on Service
InterrogationProcedures
On June 24, 1975, the Supreme Court augmented its judicial
scrutiny over the Service when it handed down the decision of
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.67 For the first time the Court
set forth constitutional standards regulating the "interrogation"
powers of Service officials. The Court's holding was that the
fourth amendment does not allow a roving'patrol (and by implication a border patrol at a fixed checkpoint) to stop a vehicle away
from the actual border or its functional equivalent and question
its occupants about their citizenship or immigration status when
the only ground for suspicion was that the occupants appeared to
be of Mexican ancestry. Brignoni-Ponce built upon the foundation
of Almeida-Sanchez68 by saying that in the same areas where Service officials are restricted in their search operations, they are now
limited in their interrogation authority.
The Service posited two sources of statutory authority for stopping cars without warrants in border areas. Section 287 (a) (1) of
the Act authorizes any officer or employee of the Service, without
a warrant, to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien
as to his right to be in or to remain in the United States. The government contended that, at least in areas contiguous to the Mexican
border, a person's appearance of Mexican ancestry alone justified
belief that he or she is an alien, and that such appearance alone
67. 95 S. Ct. 2574 (1975).
68. The court in Almeida-Sanchez held that the fourth amendment prohibits the use of roving patrols to search vehicles without a warrant or
probable cause at points removed from the border and its functional
equivalent. 413 U.S. at 272-75. Under the rule enunciated in AlmeidaSanchez, it was necessary for the Immigration Service to demonstrate that
either the search took place at the border or at the functional equivalent
thereof. Functional equivalency was determined by whether there was any

access to the particular point where the stop took place that would have
originated in the United States and not necessitated the automobile crossing
the border. Id.

satisfied the requirement of the statute. Section 287 (a) (3) of the
Act authorizes agents to conduct warrantless searches for aliens
within the territorial waters of the United States or within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States.
The Court in Brignoni-Ponce forthrightly enunciated the rule
that the fourth amendment applies to all seizures of a person including seizures which fall short of a traditional arrest and involve
only a brief detention. 69 Under this standard, which the court in
Brignoni-Ponce found applicable to immigration "seizures," short
stops may be justified on facts that do not satisfy the probable cause
standard as applied to an arrest or an extensive search of a private
vehicle for illegal aliens.70 It is only necessary that the arresting
officer be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, when
taken together with the rational inferences from these facts, reasonably warrant a belief that the person is an alien. A border patrol must, therefore, have reasonable suspicion to justify roving
border patrol stops at points that do not meet the functional equivalency criteria.
The Supreme Court noted that the broad Congressional power
over immigration authorizes Congress to admit aliens on condition
that they submit to reasonable questioning about their right to be
in the country, but that this power cannot diminish the fourth
amendment rights of citizens who may be mistaken for aliens.
The Court concluded that for the same reason the fourth amendment prohibits stopping vehicles at random to search for aliens
without proper documentation, it also forbids stopping or detaining
persons away from the actual border for questioning about their
citizenship on less than a "reasonable or founded suspicion" that
they may be aliens. 71
69. As stated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has
"seized" that person, and the fourth amendment requires that such seizure
be reasonable.
In a concurring opinion in Brignoni-Ponce, Mr. Justice Douglas, while
agreeing with the result reached, sharply disagreed in the rationale. He
quoted his own remarks from his dissent in Terry:
The infringement of any "seizure" of a person can only be "reasonable" under the fourth amendment if we require the police to possess "probable cause" before they seize him. Only that line draws
a meaningful distinction between an officer's mere inkling and the
presence of facts within the officer's personal knowledge that the
person seized has committed, is committing or is about to commit
a crime. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2583-84
(1975).
70. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1968).
71. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2577-78 (1975).
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The Court concluded that the effect of its decision was to limit
the exercise of authority granted by both sections 287 (a) (1) and
287 (a) (3). Nevertheless, the true focus of the opinion was section
287(a) (1), because the contested procedure in Brignoni-Ponce was
not an automobile search but an initial interrogration of the defendant's passengers whose testimony later was sought to be utilized
to convict the defendant of alien smuggling. 2 The Court concluded that except at the border or its functional equivalent, officers on roving patrol may stop vehicles for interrogations of drivers only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with
rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant sus75
picion that the vehicles contain illegal aliens.
The Court pointed out that any number of factors may be taken
into account to determine whether there is reasonable suspicion to
stop a car for interrogation purposes in the border area. The list
of factors may include the characteristics of the area in which the
vehicle is encountered, proximity to the border, usual patterns of
traffic on particular roads and previous experience with alien traffic. 74

Officers may also consider information about recent illegal

border crossings in the area, drivers' behavior such as nervousness
or confusion, aspects of the vehicle itself and even the characteristic
appearance of persons themselves, such as mode of dress and haircuts. However, reliance by immigration officers on the single factor of apparent Mexican ancestry of the occupants cannot, without
more, furnish founded suspicion that the occupants were aliens. 75
If interpreted strictly, the Brignoni-Ponce decision could be
limited only to interrogations made by roving search patrols in
border areas (just'as Almeida-Sanchez taken strictly only applied
to roving patrols). It would involve a strained logic, however, to
conclude that the Court meant to exclude the "founded suspicion"
test from interrogations conducted at fixed checkpoints removed
from the border, or to suggest that the test was inapposite to urban
72. Id. at 2582. In the words of the Court, the only issue presented for

decision in Brignoni was "whether a roving patrol may stop a vehicle in an
area near the border and question its occupants when the only ground for

suspicion is that the occupants appear to be of Mexican ancestry." Id. at
2578 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 2584.
74. Id.

75. Id.

immigration interrogations. Through this decision, the Court has
extended the rights of aliens and native-born Americans alike to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The two basic principles established in Brignoni-Poncehave universal applicability to all situations where aliens or other persons
are to be temporarily "seized," interrogated, and perhaps arrested.
First, foreign appearance alone will not justify a reasonable belief
that a person is an alien."0 As the Court pointed out, large numbers of native-born and naturalized citizens have physical characteristics identified with Mexican ancestry. This rationale would apply to Orientals and to other groups as well. For instance, in New
York City,77 although there are a number of "aliens without proper
documentation" of Hispanic descent, there are a multitude of Hispanic-blooded Americans who were born and raised here and over
one million Puerto Ricans who are native-born United States citizens. These people could wrongfully be mistaken for and "seized"
as aliens unless the requirement of "founded suspicion" were
applied.
Secondly, the Court firmly established the principle that to
merely stop and interrogate one believed to be an alien constitutes
a seizure of the person within the meaning of the fourth amendment, and therefore must be predicated on reasonable suspicion. 78
In this context, it is also interesting to note that the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the case of Cheung
Tin Wong v. INS 79 applied the same rationale. The court held
76. Id.
77. In Brignoni-Ponce,the Court gives a breakdown of the number and

percentages of Mexican-Americans in the states of Texas, Arizona, New
Mexico and California. 95 S. Ct. at 2583 n.12.
78. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6 (1968). Although Justice Douglas
concurs in the result reached in Brignoni-Ponce, he generally is fearful of
the reduced standard of founded suspicion and thus is disturbed that it
should spread to immigration searches. In Justice Douglas' words, "[t]he
nature of the test permits the police to interfere as well with a multitude
of law abiding citizens whose only transgression may be a nonconformist
appearance or attitude." 95 S. Ct. at 2584 (concurring opinion). See also
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MIN. L. Rnv. 349
(1974).
Police power exercised without probable cause is arbitrary. To say
that the police may accost citizens at their whim and may detain
them upon reasonable suspicion is to say, in reality, that the police
may both accost and detain citizens at their whim. Id. at 395.
79. 468 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1972). This case held that Service officers
working in an urban area such as Washington, D.C. must have reasonable
suspicion that a person is an alien before he or she can be interrogated.
To do more detailed interrogation, the officer must acquire a reasonable

suspicion that said person is an illegal alien. To arrest pursuant to statu-
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that although a particular interrogation of an Oriental alien in the
greater Washington D.C. area was lawful, an interrogation predicated upon Oriental appearance alone would not have been proper
and that a reasonable suspicion standard applies to all interrogations conducted pursuant to section 287 (a) (1).
Shortly before the Brignoni-Ponce decision, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit passed upon a related situation in United States v. Barbera.80 In that case Service officers
conducted a "roving patrol" of a bus stopped at the depot in Malone,
New York. Appellee, an alien who had allegedly entered the
United States through Canada, was detained by the border patrol
when he failed to respond to questions regarding his citizenship. 81
The bus had originated in Massena, New York, and Malone was
the first stop. Appellee moved to suppress a bus ticket and passport seized from him in connection with the interrogation. The
United States District Court for the Northern District of New York
granted appellee's motion to dismiss and the government appealed.8 2 The granting of the motion to dismiss was subsequently
affirmed.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals drew a variety of proper
implications from Alneida-Sanchez. It held that the bus station
in Malone, although very near the Canadian border, could not be
said to be its functional equivalent because there were a series of
roads leading to the bus station that did not come directly from
Canada. Thus the "immune" border search and interrogation concept was inapplicable.8 3 The court further held that while the
Service officer's presence in the public vehicle itself was permissible, the initial interrogation, that is the very first question, could
only be asked if there were "founded suspicion" that the appellee
tory authority, an INS officer must have probable cause. Furthermore, Ori-

ental appearance alone is neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion.
80. 514 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1975).
81. The government's position in Barbera,as presented in its brief on appeal is that the general "mild" questioning of Barbera by Officer Cowan
was actually not a seizure in the constitutional sense of the word. Thus
said the government, this "banter" between law officer and citizen is not
subject to the fourth amendment. Brief for Appellant at 6, id.
82. The government appealed under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1970).
83. See Note, Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 YAz L.J.

1007 (1968); Comment, Border Searches-A Prostitution of the Fourth
Amendment, 10 Am. L. Ray. 457 (1968).

was an alien.8 4 The court in Barbera decided that since the bus
on which Barbera was travelling was away from the actual border,
any apparent seizure of his person, however slight, could only be
effectuated consistent with constitutional standards. The court, in
a bit of a quandary as to what standard to apply to mere interrogations, alluded to the "founded suspicion" test and urged the Supreme Court to decide the pending Brignoni-Ponce case to set the
standards officially.8 5
84. A case with facts similar to Barbera was recently decided by the
Second Circuit. In United States v. Salter, Civil No. (9th Cir. Aug. 15,
1975) Service officials began interrograting a man and two Jamaican
women in a Buffalo bus station. The immigration officials acquired "reasonable suspicion" that the three persons were aliens when one of the
women pronounced Buffalo as "Boofalo." However, the crucial issue which
was never raised by counsel was whether the appearance of one man and
two women together in a bus station which was not the functional equivalent of the border, created a reasonable suspicion that the parties were committing criminal acts or that they were aliens illegally present in the
country.
Because counsel for appellant never questioned the validity of the
initial encounter, the Second Circuit was not obliged to resolve it and the
court proceeded to properly decide the case with respect to the standards
to be applied after the initial encounter. But with respect to the initial
encounter, so important in the immigration-related searches, the court had
the following to say:
"In addition to possible considerations of waiver, we would not
want to resolve this troublesome issue in a case where there was an
inadequate record below and where the point was not briefed by
either side on appeal." Id. at - n.7.
85. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 95 S. Ct. 2574 (1975). On the same
day as its opinion in Brignoni-Ponce the Court decided United States V.
Ortiz, 95 S. Ct. 2585 (1975), and Bowen v. United States, 95 S. Ct. 2569
(1975). These cases extended Almeida-Sanchez specifically to fixed checkpoints. Earlier, the Court dealt with Peltier v. United States, 95 S. Ct. 2313
(1975). However, rather than laying out the entire law in the body of the
decision, the Court, in Brignoni-Poncemade some significant points in footnotes. For example, while the Court directly faced the question presented,
it continued to duck the elusive issue of the validity of the nonspecific area
warrant presented:
Because the stop in this case was made without a warrant and the
officers made no effort to obtain one, we have no occasion to decide
whether a warrant could be issued to stop cars in a designated area
on the basis of conditions in the area as a whole and in the absence
of reason to suspect that any particular car is carrying aliens. 95
S. Ct. at 2580 n. 7.
Another note indicates that, at least for now, the Supreme Court does not
have to lay out the permissible urban interrogation procedures. Id. at
2582 n.9. In the Bowen and Peltier decisions, the Court concluded AlmeidaSanchez was not retroactive. But see Douglas' dissent in Peltier:
I agree with my Brother Brennan that Almeida-Sanchez was a reaffirmation of traditional Fourth Amendment principles and that the
purposes of the exclusionary rule compel exclusion of the unconsti-

tutionally seized evidence in this case. I adhere to my view that
a constitutional rule made retroactive in one case must be applied
retroactively in all (citations omitted). It is largely a matter of
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The foregoing cases, taken together, significantly restate the law.
However, they do lend themselves to differing interpretations. One
could argue that each decision should be viewed strictly and that
each time the Supreme Court speaks, it eliminates only the particular mode of searching or interrogating raised by the facts. Thus,
Almeida-Sanchez would preclude only roving patrol searches without probable cause and clearly not until Unite States v. Ortiz,86
were fixed checkpoint automobile searches without probable cause
invalidated. Following this logic, Brignoni-Ponce addressed itself
only to roving interrogations. Thus, nonfounded fixed checkpoint
interrogations, even if conducted away from the actual border,
s7
could still be constitutionally permissible
The better position would be to extrapolate general pronouncements from the words and tone of the Court which could be applied to all immigration arrest procedures. Under this approach,
Almeida-Sanchez and Ortiz restricted "immune" border searches to
the actual border or its functional equivalent. Any other searches
or seizures were to be conducted pursuant to traditional interpretations of the fourth amendment. This is obviously a substantial restriction of the language of section 287 (a) (3). Thus, all nonborder
searches within the country, including metropolitan areas, are subject to probable cause standards. The Brignoni-Ponce decision
mandated the application of the Terry test of founded suspicion to
all immigration interrogations within the country, whether conducted by roving patrols or at fixed checkpoints and whether performed near the border or in the interior of the country. Therefore, even though urban immigration officers are not alluded to in
the Brignoni-Ponce decision, they are not permitted to "rove the
subways or the streets of New York and interrogate at will."88
chance that we held the Border Patrol to the command of the
Fourth Amendment in Almeida-Sanchez rather than in the case of
this defendant. Equal justice does not permit a defendant's fate
to depend upon such a fortuity. 95 S. Ct. at 2320.
86. 95 S. Ct. 2585 (1975).
87. See the concurring opinion of Aft. Justice Rehnquist:
I wish to stress however, that the Court's opinion is confined to
full searches and does not extend to fixed checkpoint stops for the
purpose of inquiring about citizenship.... I do not regard such
stops as unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, whether or
not accompanied by "reasonable suspicion." Id. at 2589-90.
88. To Mr. Justice Douglas, even the standard of "founded suspicion" is
too permissive for urban or border area interrogations.

Whenever Service officers are enforcing the Act within the United
States anywhere away from the actual functional border, they are
subject to Terry standards in conducting interrogations or "mild
seizures" under section 287 (a) (1). In the arrest of aliens, there
must be probable cause which may properly flow from a lawfully
conducted interrogation.
The law for the border area has now been settled. Situations
will continue to arise which will result in further refinement, particularly in situations where the alien is not in a vehicle. However,
the recent Supreme Court decisions will have a profound effect
upon the development of the law in immunizing aliens from immigration enforcement policies in urban areas.8 9
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF URBAN "ALIEN SEARCH" PROCEDURES
There are strict and sophisticated laws which govern the internal
operations of the Service. Yet our law enforcement officers have

the broadest powers of all Federal agencies. When we hire, we
want men not too far left or right. We don't want alien haters nor
do we want social workers.9 0

In urban centers not adjacent to the Mexican or Canadian
borders, the broad powers exercised by immigration officers also
have been subject to controversy. 91 The major issues, as in border
areas, have centered around the effects of the constitutional "probable cause" and "founded suspicion" standards upon the general
wording of the authorizing statute. Specifically, in nonborder
urban centers, the statutory authority of section 287 (a) (1) is the
provision that is generally subject to attack. In addition, in the
districts contiguous to the border, section 287 (a) (3) is also a statute
often contested in the courts. Section 287 (a) (3) is generally not
relied upon in urban areas by the Service because there is no rationale for searching automobiles in these areas. There can be no
reasonable belief that a motor vehicle in New York City is carrying
concealed aliens.
Unquestionably, the leading case regarding section 287 (a) (1)
interrogations in urban settings is the decision by the United States
89. See generally, McGowan, Rule Making and the Police, 70 MxcH. L.

REv. 659 (1972), on the difficult task of constitutionalizing law enforcement

procedures.
90. In a candid interview on Aug. 12, 1975, with Mr. Henry Wagner,
Assistant District Director for Investigations at New York, Immigration &
Naturalization Service, the positions of the Service referred to herein were
set forth. Mr. Wagner made it clear that the attitude of the Service was
one in complete compliance with the law, and the Service's position of being
"moderate in enforcement" was made clear.
91. See note 22 supra.
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Cheung Tin Wong
v. INS. After pointing out that the Service investigator's attention
had been drawn to two individuals by their distinctively Oriental
appearance and clothing, the court stated:
We do not intend to in any way suggest that the appearance of being Oriental is any respect "suspicious", and we wish to state in
unequivocal terms that we could never condone stopping or questioning an
individual simply because he looked to be of Oriental
92
descent.
From this decision, it is clear that in urban areas appearance of
foreign ancestry is not alone sufficient to begin the interrogation
of a suspected alien. In this particular case, it is instructive to evaluate the facts which the court found to have justified the suspicion
to interrogate in the first place. Specifically, in the vicinity of a
Chinese restaurant, one Chinese gentleman stopped a taxi which
was headed down the street and another entered the back seat
of the cab. The companion who had hailed the cab bent over by
the front door and appeared to be giving the cab driver instructions.
The court held that it was unlikely that an American citizen of
Oriental descent would be incapable of speaking English well
enough to give directions to a cab driver for himself. 93
These circumstances suggesting a distinct inability to speak
English plus an Oriental appearance were held sufficient grounds
for the urban investigator's "founded suspicion" that the person was
an alien. Section 287 (a) (1) thus empowered the investigator to interrogate the potential alien as to his right to be in or remain in the
United States. This section makes no distinction between a lawful
permanent resident and an alien without proper documentation.
Arguably, the validity of this decision would be questionable in
contemporary New York where the are thousands of Chinese as
well as other Oriental peoples. Although a large portion of
these people are citizens, oftentimes they live and work in an
insular community (particularly Chinatown) and thus speak English poorly. In addition, many United States citizens from Puerto
92. 468 F.2d 1123, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (emphasis added).
93. Id. In order to become a naturalized U.S. citizen, the applicant must
pass an English language test. In reality the test is so simplistic that it
would not be at all unlikely that a naturalized citizen would have difficulty
conversing with a cab driver, particularly if it were necessary to give the
cab driver any directions.

Rico and other Hispanic lands cannot adequately speak English.
Even in the District of Columbia, this decision certainly represents
the outer parameters of "founded suspicion."
The court further refined urban officials' powers to forcibly detain, for purposes of further interrogation, a person found to be
an alien. The court enunciated the principle that when a reasonable suspicion that a person is an alien turns into a reasonable belief
that he is in the country illegally, an investigator is authorized to
engage in "forcible detention of a temporary nature for the purpose
of detailed interrogation." 94 The court in Cheung Tin Wong
quoted the holding in Au Yi Lau v. INS:
We hold that immigration officers in accordance with the Congressional grant of authority found in section 287(a) (1) may make
forcible detentions of a temporary nature for the purposes of interrogation under circumstances creating a reasonable suspicion,
not arising to the level of probable cause to arrest, that the individual so detained is illegally in this country.95
Utilizing the standards developed in Terry v. Ohio, such detentions
are to be judged from case to case by individual analysis of the
particular facts. 96
The District of Columbia Circuit Court, in dealing with permissible techniques to be utilized by urban immigration officials, has
interpreted section 287 (a) (1) to embody two related but separate
concepts. First, an immigration officer must have some suspicion
that a person is an alien-either a permanent resident, a nonimmigrant, an alien without proper documentation, or any other type
of noncitizen status-in order to interrogate him or to ask him any
question whatsoever as to his right to be in or remain in the United
States. It would seem, however, that if one of the key elements
of the fourth amendment is to prevent the harrassment of innocent
people by the police authorities, then an encounter consisting of
only a casual question designed to elicit responses evidencing a
heavy accent, no knowledge of the English language or unfamiliarity with the neighborhood, must still be based upon "founded suspicion." 97 Among the detailed law enforcement procedures of the
New York District of the Service is a rule which prohibits, as a
94. For a more detailed discussion of this two-pronged analysis of the
consecutive requirements for more detailed interrogation, see cases cited
note 35 supra. See also Cheung Tin Wong v. INS, 468 F.2d 1123, 1126-27
(D.C. Cir. 1972); Au Yi Lau v. INS, 445 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
95. Cheung Tin Wong v. INS, 468 F.2d 1123, 1126-27 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
See 72 CoLTuM. L. REV. 593, 602 (1972), where the author points out
that even temporary detentions by the Service for interrogation are a device
that can be used to harass innocent people.
96. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
97. See note 95 supra.
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matter of policy, the utilization of such "ruse" techniques in which
immigration officials ask innocent questions of a suspected alien
without the necessary "founded suspicion." Based on the response,
the officials acquire the requisite "founded suspicion" for further
interrogation. However, the Service believes that these procedures
are constitutional, and that nothing as a "matter of law" prevents
these activities. Certainly, Cheung Tin Wong would not justify
"fishing-expedition" encounters and would not distinguish such
encounters from "interrogation." Definitionally, an interrogation
must begin with the first question, and founded suspicion must be
based upon reasonably articulable facts or the fourth amendment
will be rendered meaningless. The effect of the Service's narrow
conception of the law was manifest in previous enforcement efforts,
now fortunately abandoned, wherein immigration officers would
position themselves at subway steps or other public places in areas
believed to contain a high concentration of "illegal aliens." Special
attention would be given to areas such as Chinatown or to Jackson
Heights and Corona, New York, where Hispanic persons reside.
"Ruse-type" questions would be asked to determine whether the
person spoke English, which would arguably then give officers the
necessary "founded suspicion." The practical application of these
standards can be quite difficult. Sometimes the interrogation would
be based on the foreign appearance, mannerisms, wearing apparel
and other similar facts of the subject or subjects. These techniques
constituted a clear infringement of fourth amendment rights since it
was this very type of police-state tactic which the writers of the
fourth amendment wished to prohibit. There was no reasonable
suspicion to justify the asking of the first question. Nor would
sufficient "founded suspicion" be furnished by phone calls from
concerned neighbors or neighborhood associations reporting the
presence of "illegal aliens" in their neighborhood. Such people obviously do not have the necessary expertise to make such a judgment.
The second concept in the District of Columbia Circuit's interpretation of section 287 (a) (1) is the right of the immigration officer
to forcibly detain the alien and further question him once he has
reasonable suspicion that the alien is illegally in the United States.
The Brignoni-Ponce decision appears to support the Cheung Tin
Wong standard since in Brignoni-Ponce the Court clearly mandated
that the standard of "founded suspicion" applies to interrogation

of aliens. It should be noted, though, that the Court specifically
refrained from ruling on the applicability of the decision to Cheung
Tin Wong within every situation. 93
In major urban areas, the Service's exercise of its section 287(a)
(1) power has been rather tempered within the last one or two
years because of concern about the constitutionality of certain practices and procedures. Nevertheless, many of the present policies
and concepts of the Service fall within the gray areas of the law.
With due respect for the opposite view of the Service, many of these
policies do not withstand the scrutiny of the newer dictates of the
fourth amendment. The major area of difference concerns the
question of when an "interrogation" within the meaning of section
287(a) (1) ensues. It is the position of the Service that an officer
is permitted to ask a casual question of a person who appears to
be an alien on mere appearance alone. The plain-clothed officer
does not identify himself and the Service takes the position that
any person has the right to decline to answer, to tell the officer
to "leave him alone" or to refuse to cooperate in any other manner.
Under such circumstances, the officer will not be authorized to take
any additional action.9 9 However, if the alien unwittingly approached the officer in the first instance and conducted himself in
such a manner as to provide founded suspicion, interrogation would
be proper.10 0
At present, the law enforcement effort of the Service has shifted
emphasis. More reliance is now placed upon specific leads concerning the whereabouts of particular illegal aliens and obtaining sophisticated information from other federal agencies. In most cases,
these sources provide the requisite probable cause or founded suspicion to constitutionally apprehend aliens. In addition to the issuance of specific arrest warrants by administrative bodies and the
issuance by courts of warrants to search premises for particular
persons, warrants have even been issued to arrest persons in their
apartment building. The untested concept of the "general area
warrant" proposed for border areas' 0' has not been employed by
the Service in an urban setting.
The major areas in which the Service has not deferred to the
case analysis discussed above are in its primary procedures for in98. In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, the Court stated that it is not
necessarily deciding at this point the constitutional "standard" for urban
encounters. 95 S. Ct. 2574 at 2581-82 nn. 8 & 9.
99. See note 90 supra.
100. Id.

101. Id.
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terrogations conducted mainly at places of business and restaurants.10 2 The Service believes that once the officer has received
permission from the employer to go on the premises, any person
thereon is "free game" for purposes of interrogation. This position
contradicts the constitutional rule requiring "founded suspicion"
that a particular person is an alien before the officer may ask the
first question. 103 Just as in the Barbera case, even though the
officer rightly had access to the public place (a public bus),
his power to begin to interrogate a specific individual could be
invoked only upon obtaining "founded suspicion" that the person
is an alien. The rule set forth in Barbera applies to any person
about to be interrogated at his place of employment by a Service
official. Furthermore, the employer has no right to consent to
interrogation of his employees since it is the employees' fourth
amendment rights that are in question. 04

Contrariwise, the con-

stitutional requirements of the fourth amendment might be satisfied if Service officials, having been granted permission to be on the
premises, simply listened for clues which provided a reasonable
suspicion that certain workers were aliens. However, it is doubtful
that foreign appearance of an employee of a Chinese restaurant, for
instance, alone would be sufficient to constitute a reasonable
assumption that the employee is an alien; many United States
citizens of Chinese ancestry also work in these restaurants. The
same is true of Spanish-appearing persons working in factories.
Apartment house searches by Service officials in New York
City are presently conducted in accordance with traditional standards. However, there is one interesting area of questionable constitutionality. It is the practice of the Service to have either (1) a
warrant for the arrest of a particular individual or (2) a fairly reliable clue, insufficient to obtain a warrant, but adequate to support a section 287(a) (1) interrogation. The officers knock at the
door of an apartment, ask for the particular individual sought, and
question the other inhabitants of the apartment concerning their
alien status. 0 5 With no other articulable facts, it is doubtful that
102. Id.
103. Fragomen, Legislative and Judicial Development-Constitutional
Right of Aliens upon Arrest, 21 IT'L MIGRATION REV. 69 (1973).
104. In Barbera, it certainly could not be said that the bus driver could
have consented to searches of the passengers on his bus.
105. See note 90 supra.

the mere presence on the premises of someone believed to be
an alien without proper documentation is sufficient to result in
"founded suspicion" that any person at that location might also
be an alien.
What emerges from the section 287(a)(1) standards as applied
in an urban area such as New York City is the concept that it will
take time before these constitutional decisions make themselves
felt upon law enforcement officials. There are a variety of
interpretations as to the exact scope of court decisions and judicial
limitations upon immigration search procedures. Understandably,
the Service takes a very narrow view of the limits, particularly
when the Supreme Court cases do not directly concern interrogations of aliens in urban area. 106 Nevertheless, it is clear that the
hypothetical position taken by the Service regarding its "ruse"
questioning procedures, and its nonapplication of Cheung Tin Wong
and Brignoni-Ponce standards to mass interrogations conducted at
public places are very serious and clear-cut violations of the applicable constitutional law and should be eliminated nationally by the
Service as a matter of law and not merely local policy. The New
York District Office of the Service has taken a middle of the road
position; it is optimistic that its view will be upheld but has yielded
on some important issues. For example, due to the refinement of
its procedures, the Service has administratively abandoned dragnet
type round-ups and unfounded interrogationslo 7
106. Id.
107. Illustrative of the emerging standards is a recent decision by a
United States District Court in Illinois, Illinois Migrant Council v. Alva
Pilliod, Civil No. 74C-3111 (E.D. M1l.
July 29, 1975). The court summarized
the law relating to street encounters and area control procedures used for
apprehending illegal aliens. With respect to the street encounters, the
court held that the only workable and constitutionally responsive test
which has to be met before a Service official can make even the briefest
seizure of a person suspected of being an alien is "whether there are
specific, articulable facts and reasonable inferences to be drawn that a
person is an alien illegally in the country." Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
This is considerably stronger language than that used in Cheung Tin Wong
which required only a reasonable suspicion by an official that a person
was an alien. In the present case, however, the court refrained from providing a strong list of articulable factors and still permitted the Service to
look at the "totality of circumstances."
The court also held that the area control operations utilized in this case
were invalid. The government did not assert that it had a warrant or
probable cause, but suggested there was consent by the searched parties.
Rejecting this, the court held that it would be "hypocrisy" to hold that
knocks on the doors of the dormitories and individual residences produced
consent "voluntarily given and not the result of duress or coercion." Id.
at 35. Nor could the government successfully assert that the plant supervisor could consent to the interrogations of the workers.
In deciding that a preliminary injunction was a proper remedy against
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Section 287 (a) (2), the other significant section of the Act regard-

ing urban procedures, authorizes any officer or employee of the
Service without a warrant
to arrest any alien who in his presence or view is entering or attempting to enter the United States in violation of any law or
regulation made in pursuance of law regulating the admission, exclusion or expulsion of the aliens, or to arrest any alien in the
United States if he has reason to believe that the alien so arrested
is in the United States in violation of any such law or regulation
and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his
arrest .... 108
Essentially this section sets forth the basic authority for arrest
without a warrant in two situations: (1) Where an alien enters
or attempts to enter the United States in the presence of an officer,
and (2) where the officer has reason to believe than an alien is

illegally in the United States and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.

Due to the mobility of aliens, the vast ma-

jority of arrests are without a warrant. Thus, as a practical matter,
it becomes difficult to challenge the validity of most arrests by of-

ficers, particularly when the officer proceeded in accordance with
constitutional standards properly in the first instance.

Obviously,

if the officer does not make an arrest at the time he has reason
to believe an alien is illegal, the alien will be gone and a future

arrest rendered impossible.
The phrase "reason to believe" in this section of the statute must
be construed identically with the constitutional standard of prob-

able cause. Probable cause generally results from an interrogation
of the alien, an inspection of his documents, or both. If any of
the elements is missing, the arrest is unlawful. Thus, if there
is no reason to believe the alien will flee, a warrant must be oban agency functioning in a quasi-police capacity, the court required the
complainants to show that a particular official policy was illegal. The
court gave significant emphasis to the inconsistencies in the Service Handbook and eventually decided that the Service's publications distributed to
its officers constituted sufficient illegal official pronouncements to grant the
injunctive relief.
108. 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (a) (2) (1970); see note 22 supra. In Valerio v.
Mulle, 148 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1957), a warrantless search was upheld
when an officer, upon examining the papers of an alien, realized that his
visa had expired and feared that such alien would escape immediately. In
Taylor v. Fine, 115 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Cal. 1953), immigration officers armed
without warrants arrested illegal entrants on plaintiff's ranch and were victorious in a civil damage suit instituted against them.

tained to effectuate an arrest. Too frequently, in spite of specific
information received from reliable informants, warrants are not obtained unless the Service has previously obtained information concerning this particular individual. For instance, suppose that an
ex-friend, estranged spouse, or previous employer, whose reliability
cannot be questioned, informs the Service that a "Jose Gonzalez,"
who is in the United States illegally from Colombia, lives at a "suchand-such" address. In most cases, a warrant would not be obtained
to interrogate that person 1 9 even though he may be present at that
address weeks later. Under such circumstances, it cannot be contended that there is a likelihood of escape. In such a case, arrest
without a warrant would be improper. Arguably, the Service's
policy appears to be predicated upon a belief that presence in the
United States is so important to an alien, that if he were let free
while the officer obtained a warrant, he would probably flee. The
Service is no more justified in arresting an alien without the formal procedure of a warrant than is any other law enforcement
110
agency.
However, since the majority of arrests do not occur as the result
of reliable information about a particular individual, and thus an
officer's authority to arrest would not even be activated unless an
interrogation procedure were first employed, the key to constitutionalizing urban administrative procedures lies in stricter deference to the statutory language of section 287 (a) (1) and the various
cases decided thereunder.
In spite of various disagreements, there are strong indicators from
109. See note 90 supra.
110. Id. Among other items discussed in the interview was the question
whether prior employment of illegal aliens by an employer could furnish reasonable suspicion that there were illegal aliens presently on his
premises. The INS asserts that in such cases it always gets permission from
the employer to enter the premises but that it need not do so. Furthermore,
the isolated cases of employer obstinacy were discussed. It turns out, however, that most employers, even when presently there is no law with respect
to them, realize that it is in their best interests to cooperate with the Service. Mr. Wagner also discussed the fact that the administration took faithful
execution of the law very seriously, but that isolated illegal searches might
occur occasionally when certain young officers go out and try to make a
name for themselves. He likened this behavior to a young attorney trying
to establish his reputation.

The Service concedes that exploitation of the alien is not a particularly

accurate charge. Rather, the employer of illegal aliens makes large profits
and therefore exploits the American consumer since the latter pays more
for the goods than a normal mark-up would justify.
The power of the INS to issue their own administrative arrest warrants
was discussed, and furthermore, the Service contended that its use of section
287 (a) (3) was restricted to searches of vessels in New York Harbor on
probable cause or pursuant to a warrant.
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the courts that even after the internal alterations in service procedures, there remain unconstitutional techniques being utilized.
There are effective means to enforce the Act within urban areas
such as New York City within constitutional parameters. The final
steps toward effective fourth amendment protection would be to
require strict adherence to Cheung Tim Wong and Brignoni-Ponce
in all interrogations, and to insist that arrest be utilized where specific information is available.
SUGGESTED FUTURE ACTION

With immigration law enforcement officials beginning to act
within the ambit of the fourth amendment, which is now rather
well-defined and clearly profiled, a variety of techniques emerge
that promise to be effective. In border areas, assuming the broadest interpretation of the recent decisions,"' the most effective
although expensive means of regulating alien flow would be to
fortify the actual border. Admittedly, this might require pouring
massive funds into the establishment of additional border checkpoints and the utilization of sophisticated equipment along most of
the 2,000 mile Mexican border.1 2 If constitutional mandates are
followed, however, such expense is no longer optional. If the Constitution only permits officers to function with broad powers at the
border itself, 1 3 then that is where the Service must concentrate
its operations. Furthermore, in border areas the Service could also
spend significantly more time and effort cultivating specific leads
and tips and could also integrate into its procedures increased acquisition of specific warrants to search vehicles. Of course, "headsup" investigation would still permit a roving patrol to find
"founded suspicion" or "probable cause," but such would have to
be done within the guidelines of the fourth amendment. In summary, now that the courts have spoken, the duty lies with law
111. For purposes of this discussion, it must be assumed that the narrow
position taken in Mr. Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in United States v.
Ortiz, 95 S. Ct. 2585 (1975), is incorrect and that the holdings of the cases
do in fact prohibit unfounded interrogations even at fixed checkpoints.
112. For a detailed discussion of the situation at the border and the difficulties of patroling same, see Appendix in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
95 S. Ct. at 2591.
113. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 95 S. Ct. 2574 (1975).

enforcement officials and administrators to constitutionalize their
own procedures.

114

The same suggestions apply to urban areas where immigration
officials are likewise restricted by the command of the fourth
amendment. 11 5 Particularly in their interrogations of persons
believed to be aliens, urban investigators ought to spend virtually
all of their time pursuing specific leads. They must take special
precautions not to choose a specific employment site and then proceed to interrogate all workers without "founded suspicion." 11 6
Although this may be more expensive, more time consuming and
somewhat less effective, it is essential to preserve the fourth amendment rights of all.
The use of area search warrants, unless strictly applied, would
virtually undo the entire progression and expansion of fourth
amendment rights during the past four years. Area search warrant
procedures for nonborder searches are not an acceptable method
1 7
for balancing the interests of the individual and the government.
An area warrant would be used by both roving patrols and fixed
checkpoints operating within a reasonable distance from the border. 1 8 In fact, in a place such as New York, a city of 8 million
which is not more than 15 miles from the "sea frontier" at its furthest point, all New Yorkers would be subject to area warrant
searches. There would be prior application for a warrant, and
supposedly this is sufficient to establish limitations on discretion
of the officers." 0 This could allegedly be accomplished by limiting the area and time period of operation and the intensity of the
search. It has been suggested that the warrant could also require
a return of information to enable the Service and the magistrate
120
Justo assess the productivity of searches in particular areas.
tice Powell suggested several relevant factors that may be used to
determine area "probable cause.' 1 2 ' Specific criteria for probable
cause could also be developed and published by the Director of the
114. See note 89 supra.
115. See note 90 supra.
116. Id. This is exactly the procedure used in New York City, and to
the extent that it disregards the holding in Cheung Tin Wong it is an improper one.
117. For a contrary view, see 27 V.AND. L. Rsv. 523, 534 (1974).
118. Id. at 535.
119. Id. at 534.
120. See The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARv. L. REv. 196, 202 (1973).
121. These were frequency of illegal aliens, proximity to the border, geographic characteristics, and probable degree of interference with innocent
persons. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 283-84 (1973)
(Powell, J. concurring).

[VOL. 13: 82, 1975]

Searching for Illegal Aliens
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Domestic Control Division of the Service or by the Attorney
General. 12 2 In spite of these procedural suggestions, the area
warrant is simply a subtle mode of returning to the pre-AlmeidaSanchez unlimited discretion. 123 When an area warrant is used,
no matter how specifically drawn or how fairly issued, all innocent
persons who happen to fall into the area become subject to what
otherwise would be unconstitutional searches. The area warrant
is a mere ceremony that causes delay and expense, and it could
become a rubber stamp procedure in the hands of an unconscientious magistrate. 124 There is not enough reason to believe that an
issuing magistrate is significantly less disinterested in apprehending aliens than a Service official, and in most cases, he is far less
knowledgeable. If officers were to violate the area warrants' provisions, it is said they would be subject to a civil damage suit in
tort for specific damages. 2 5 However, even compliance with the
terms of the proposed area warrant would result in a plethora of
"legal searches" which would also be highly objectionable.
The danger in this procedure would also exist if immigration officers authorized to conduct area warrant searches in proximity to
the border could abuse their "two-hat" status by using their initial
stops of vehicles in search of aliens for the purpose of searching the
vehicle to find contraband.' 2" If the immigration officer's actual
purpose for stopping the vehicle is to make a search in his customs
officer's role, and he used the area warrant to validate the initial
stop, the suspicion standard would be circumvented and the developing check on customs officers' discretion would be weakened substantially. Moreover, since the flow of illegal narcotics is more

122. This division of the Justice Department is responsible for border patrol operations.
123. See case cited note 35 supra.
124. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 548 (1967) (Clark, J. dissenting).
125. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411-27 (1971) (Burger, C.J. dissenting). Professor
Wright espouses an intermediate position that would exclude evidence when
official violations are flagrant and use tort remedies when violations are
minor. See Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?,
50 TEx. L. REV. 736 (1972).
126. For an example of nonabuse of the "two-hat" standard see Fernandez v. United States, 321 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1963).

critical than the illegal alien problem and since immigration officers
uncovered $5,000,000 worth of drugs in 1971, to discontinue the dual
role of immigration officers would only force the Treasury Department to hire more customs officers.1 27 However, this "two-hat"
problem with the area search warrant could be avoided by restricting immigration officers to seizing contraband found in plain view
during their immigration search, and to authorize a more intensive
search only if they have or acquire probable cause after the initial
28

stop.1

The above suggestions, of course, refer to modes of enforcing the
immigration law by means of police work.1 29 It also has been
suggested that legislative
action be taken which would create criminal and civil sanctions'8 0 upon employers and other groups which
harbor illegal aliens.' 8 ' It is doubtful that such laws would have
a permanent beneficial effect on the problem because they will also
be circumvented in time. In addition, the potential for abuse and
exploitation of aliens and discrimination against persons with for82
eign appearance, surnames or accents would be encouraged.
Moreover, the underlying assumptions of the proposed "sanctions
bill" are highly questionable since there is no evidence that aliens
without documentation have any adverse effect on the economy or
other aspects of the society. In fact, they may be contributing positively to the economic structure. 8
Notwithstanding consideration of pending legislation, the fourth
amendment remains, and enforcement of the Act will have to be
done constitutionally.8 4 To that extent, the judiciary has clearly
127. 1971 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP.152.
128. In Fernandez v. United States, 321 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1963), the officer had probable cause when he smelled marijuana coming from the hood
of the car.
129. See generally Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 MmNN. L. REv. 349 (1974).
130. H.R. 8713, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), was favorably reported by
the House Judiciary Committee July 30, 1975. This is the successor bill to
H.R. 982, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See note 23 supra.
131. Fragomen, Poor Immigrants Discriminated Against, MI RIox
TODAY, Sept. 1, 1973, at 1.
132. Id.
133. Fragomen, Illegal Aliens: Prejudice and Facts, MIGRAT oN TODAY,
March , 1975, at 6. See also other articles in MIGRATiON TODAY, March -,
1975. For the proposition that there is no negative economic impact, see
Piore, Restrictions Aren't the Answer-The Illegals, THE N w REPurBLic 7
(1975).
134. See note 90 supra. The INS while recognizing that prior to AlmeidaSanchez there appeared to be no constitutional limits upon their procedures,
now realize that there are very strong constraints upon officers' abilities
to interrogate and to take aliens into their custody.
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recognized the necessity of strict application of constitutional standards over political and social expediency.
CONCLUSION

It has been noted that while the proposed legislation to combat
the problem -has become recognized as increasingly complex, 18 5
there have also arisen parallel "restraints" on the powers of law
enforcement officials through the vehicle of the fourth amendment.
Apparently, as we approach the realization that so long as the
United States remains the richest nation in the world immigrants
will flock here, we simultaneously realize that we cannot tear down
the country's infrastructure of rights to combat this phenomenon.
We are confronted with the realization that even if our sophisticated immigration law enforcement activities have approached their
capacities, we cannot attempt to prop up the system by unconstitutional means. Weakening the fourth amendment prior to AlmeidaSanchez' 36 was morally unfair, and pragmatically ineffectual.
Armed search patrols with power to cordon off whole areas and
require each individual to identify himself might be more effective-but are we willing to accept the storm trooper concept in
order to control immigration? No immigration official, no matter
how zealous would agree to such a solution.
It has been noted and documented that the fourth amendment
began its spread with respect to vehicle searches for aliens in border
areas and has extended to urban interrogations and arrest procedures. In the future, law enforcement officers should comply
with the judicial restrictions imposed upon them by channeling
their efforts into activities that are constitutionally permissible in
the alien search field. These include pursuit of tips and leads, acquisition of search and arrest warrants, actual border fortification,
and the utilization of intricate detection equipment. Of course, the
concept of the area warrant must be rejected if any of the theory
that has been developed is to persevere. The constitution permits
little more. These methods are probably as effective as possible
in this area. With a strong. fourth amendment, the enforcement
officials would grow far more circumspect in exercising their
135. See note 133 supra.
136. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).

powers and a major exception to our right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures would be abolished.
No further criminalizing of the sociological phenomenon of
human migration should occur. That approach is counter productive and unlikely to increase the effectiveness of present regulatory
procedures. 13 7 A proposed course to follow would be the offering
of a "blanket amnesty" to all aliens presently in the United States.
This would serve to deinstitutionalize inquisitional behavior against
certain groups. The substantial money saved could be invested in
detailed border fortification and better monitoring of the immigration status of aliens currently entering the United States with valid
188
temporary visas.
Within the past year, the news media has been calling attention
to the presence of alien workers without proper documents. From
New York to Los Angeles, a mood of suspicion has emerged.
Hundreds of thousands of persons are suspected of having illegal
status only because of ethnic characteristics such as color and accent. Public attitude necessarily affects administrative procedures
because the law is enforced by persons who are both public servants
and members of the public.
By emphasizing the extreme importance of strict adherence to
the law in providing constitutional protection for aliens, the judiciary will prevent the development of enforcement policies which
reflect a xenophobia in the public. Tf the Service assiduously
applies these pronouncements, a healthy balance will have been
reached. The Service will be free to pursue its worth objectives in
a constitutional manner, which will be done without offending
individual or group integrity and privacy.

137. See note 133 supra.
138. Since a substantial portion of the Service budget is allocated to the
location of "illegal aliens" already present in the United States by regularizing their status, enforcement manpower could be reallocated to the border and other points of entry.

